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ABSTRACT
What is the role of a port? It is a place that handles ships and cargo with operational
efficiency. For this reason, ports must be seen as elements in value-driven chain
systems or in value chain constellations. They deliver value to shippers and to third
party service providers; customer segmentation and targeting is on the basis of a
clearly specified value for itself and for the chain in which it is embedded.
Ports no longer operate in an insulated environment. They face the same competitive
forces that companies in other industries experience. There is rivalry among existing
competitors, continuing threat of new entrants, potential for global substitutes,
presence of powerful customers and powerful supplies.
Since the early 1980s, moves to rapidly liberalise trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) have strongly influenced policy makers in many developing countries in their
thinking about this challenge. Openness to international market forces and
competition was expected to allow those countries to alter both the pace and the
pattern of their participation in international trade, thereby overcoming balance-of-
payments problems and accelerating growth, to catch up with industrial countries.
Today, the Port of Durban is the clear African leader in total container throughput. In
the world port league for 2000 established by Containerisation International Yearbook
2001, Durban was in 44th position.
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The Port of Durban is an important gateway with regards to general cargo flows
especially since the port's goal is to become a hub port in the Southern Africa. It has
great economic value for the city and the country at large. It can be seen that the poor
economic and operational efficiency of the port leads to poor overall economic
growth for the nation. It is therefore desirable to ensure that the terminal is always
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This paper aims to show that the impediments to the growth of the economy at large are
partly as a direct result of the lack of performance of our ports (it will confine the
argument to the Port of Durban) with regards to general cargo flows (inbound and
outbound).
Bulk and break bulk cargo flows have always been able to compete successfully and for
this reason, the arguments will focus mainly on the general cargo flows Le.
containerisation. The Port of Durban has, over the past few years, been severely criticised
and penalised for the low productivity levels achieved at the container terminals,
therefore this paper will attempt to examine some of the shortfalls experienced at the
terminals in greater detail.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the port system does not operate in isolation but
within a broader logistical framework. For this reason, this paper will not cover all the
contributing factors hindering a port's performance and may therefore not be truly
reflective of the holistic port scenario. Nonetheless, it will endeavour to reflect the
current problems experienced by the container terminal in Durban and probe its causes.
What is the role of a port? It is a place that handles ships and cargo with operational
efficiency. For this reason, ports must be seen as elements in value-driven chain systems
or in value chain constellations. They deliver value to shippers and to third party service
providers; customer segmentation and targeting is on the basis of a clearly specified value
for itself and for the chain in which it is embedded (Robinson: 2002). A brief history of
containerisation and the need for greater port efficiency will now be examined.
Containerisation is the technique or practice of stowing freight in reusable containers of
uniform size and shape for transportation. The freight may sometimes be oddly shaped
and in different quantities, but when stowed and shipped in containers, it can be handled
as a single piece thus making it a lot easier to transport. This reduces the time and costs
factor. Containerisation also enables intermodal transport, Le. the total movement from
the origin to the destination, using different modes en route likes roadways, railways,
shipping, airlines etc. via a combination of several or just two of these modes.
Before containerisation, cargo would have had to be loaded on a truck piece by piece and
driven to a port and there, at the dockside, each piece would be individually unloaded and
then hoisted onto the ship. This was a cumbersome and time consuming process. Ships
often needed to be in port for 10 days to complete the process of unloading and loading.
Containerisation is thought to be a modern conception. Nothing could be farther from the
truth. There are records of containers being used in pre-railway tramways of England,
Silesia and America as early as the 1830s. They were used for the transportation of Ores,
Limestone, and Coal etc. These containers were much like the ones seen today, but were
much smaller and most had a capacity of 5-10 tons (Fleming and Hayuth: 1994).
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The marine containers that we see today originated in the second half of 1950. They were
the brainchild of Malcolm McLean, considered to be the father of containerisation.
Containerisation has brought about a revolution in the transport industry, giving rise to
significant economies throughout the transport chain, permit freight to be transported
more cheaply and over greater distances than ever before. This is what geographers refer
to as transferability and it has given shipping lines much greater freedom to serve markets
from a wider choice of ports. Markets that were once seen to be in the exclusive
hinterland of a particular port can now be served by many gateways. Individual ports no
longer have exclusive control over inland markets, and they can no longer be sure that
trade even in their own local areas is secure.
Today many of the developing countries are taking up the challenge of developing their
ports. In practice this amounts to eliminating as much as possible the X-inefficiency,
which is so typical of large and complex public (port) institutions (Winkelmans: 2002).
The port sector has radically changed over the past two centuries. During the 19th century
and the first half of the 20th century ports tended to be instruments of state or colonial
powers and port access and egress were regarded as a means to control markets.
Competition between ports was minimal and port-related costs were relatively
insignificant in comparison to the high cost of ocean transport and inland transport (Goss:
1968). As a result, there was little incentive to improve port efficiency. How times have
changed! Most ports today are competing with one another on a global scale and, with the
tremendous gains in productivity in ocean transport achieved over the past several
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decades, ports are now perceived to be the remaining controllable component in
improving the efficiency of ocean transport logistics.
This has generated a drive today to improve port efficiency, lower cargo-handling costs
and integrate port services with other components of the global distribution network.
Because of the capital intensity of such efficiency improvements, these have also
generated the drive to unbind ports from bureaucratic control of public entities and
encourage private sector operation of a wide range of port-related activities.
Ports no longer operate in an insulated environment. They face the same competitive
forces that companies in other industries experience. There is rivalry among existing
competitors, continuing threat of new entrants, potential for global substitutes, presence
of powerful customers and powerful supplies (see box one).
In a free market environment there is no reason that governments have to be the service
providers not even of so-called public interest in order to acquire port efficiency.
Consequently, the state should not determine the individual port strategies, management
and operations; its core competency should be to stimulate, to co-ordinate, and to
facilitate port development, port investment, etc. This is not just a difference in words, it
is a whole world of difference, viz. in mentality and attitude (Winkelmans: 2002).
The following chapters will focus on specific areas. Chapter Two focuses on trade in
developing countries and covers the development of the international seaborne trade. The
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this chapter covers the developments of the liner trade. Other focus areas are the
production of the port service and measuring port performance. The unbundling of state-
owned enterprises and the "dreaded" privatisation case are explained. The problem here
is whether such interventions are prudent for the South African economy. The initial cash
boosts raised from the proceeds of privatisation are not necessarily beneficial over the
long term. Therefore, we will take a balanced approach to the privatisation issue and try
to establish a possible path that the government should adopt regarding the concessioning
of the port terminals.
Chapter Three deals with trade reform in South Africa (SA). With the changes in the
way the global economy operates and the role of globalisation, SA needs to realign its
trade mechanisms so as to not lag behind the rest of the world. The main problem here is
that the trade liberalisation reforms that are expected to be undertaken by developing
nations do not necessarily benefit them but enrich the more advanced developed nations.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) need
to rethink their strategies in forcing developing nations to open up their economies until
they can compete on an equal footing or subject to some trade spin-offs. This chapter also
looks at role of the South African transport network and the various legislative
frameworks that have been devised to deal with the inefficiencies in our transport system
with emphasis on the Port of Durban.
Chapter Four contains the concluding remarks. The implications of poor port
performance will be reviewed and also some of the progresses made in addressing some
6
of these inefficiencies. The port development framework for the Port of Durban will be
discussed as well the roadmap for the concessioning process.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.1. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE
Fundamentally, the basic policy challenge facing most developing countries remains how
best to channel the elemental forces of trade and industry to wealth creation and the
satisfaction of human wants. Shifting away from their dependence on the export of
primary commodities towards greater production and exports of industrial products has
often been viewed as a means of their participating more effectively in the international
division of labour. Manufactures are expected to offer better prospects for export
earnings not only because they allow for a more rapid productivity growth and expansion
of production, but also because they hold out the promise of greater price stability even as
volumes expand, thereby avoiding the declining terms of trade that have frustrated the
long-term growth performance of many commodity-dependent economies (Trade and
Development Report: 2002).
Since the early 1980s, moves to rapidly liberalise trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) have strongly influenced policy makers in many developing countries in their
thinking about this challenge. Openness to international market forces and competition
was expected to allow those countries to alter both the pace and the pattern of their
participation in international trade, thereby overcoming balance-of-payments problems
and accelerating growth, to catch up with industrial countries. Since the beginning of
modern economics the literature concerning the determination of living standards has
been interested in trade (Smith: 1776). The lack of initial consensus among researchers
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on the relationship between trade and growth has been mirrored by differences in the
actual trade strategies of developing countries. Despite some lingering controversy,
empirical studies show a positive relationship between trade and growth.
Frankel and Romer (1999) claim that" ... trade has a quantitatively large, significant, and
robust positive effect on income" (Ades and Glaeser: 1999). During the 1960s and into
the 1970s, many countries adopted import substitution policies to protect their infant
industries, though a few economies in East Asia took a different approach. By the 1990s
many developing countries, including most of the large ones, had shifted to an outward-
oriented strategy and had seen accelerations in their growth rates (Dollar and Kraay:
2001). These recent liberalisations have reduced tariffs and, in some cases, non-tariff
barriers too. For instance, Asia reduced its average tariff rate from 30% at the beginning
of the 1980s to 14% by the end of the I990s, and Latin America reduced its average tariff
rate from 3 I% to I I% (World Bank Report: 2002). These reductions in artificial trade
barriers have implied that the relative importance of transport costs as a determinant of
trade has increased.
During this period, the exports of developing countries have, indeed, grown faster than
the world average and now account for almost one third of world merchandise trade.
Much of that growth has been in manufactures, which today account for 70% of
developing country exports; for some products developing country exports account for
around half or more of world exports (Trade and Development Report: 2002). More
importantly, many developing countries appear to have succeeded in moving into
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technology-intensive manufactured exports, which have been among the most rapidly
growing products in world trade over the past two decades, notably electronic and
electrical goods.
However, on closer examination, the picture is much more nuanced. With the exception
of a few East Asian first-tier newly industrialising economies (NIEs) with a significant
industrial base, which were already closely integrated into the global trading system,
developing country exports are still concentrated on products derived essentially from the
exploitation of natural resources and the use of unskilled labour, which have limited
prospects for productivity growth and lack dynamism in world markets. Statistics
showing a considerable expansion of technology-intensive, supply-dynamic, high-value-
added exports from developing countries are misleading. Such products indeed appear to
be exported by developing countries, but in reality those countries are often involved in
the low-skill assembly stages of international production chains organised by
transnational corporations (TNCs).
Most of the technology and skills are embodied in imported parts and components, and
much of the value added accrues to producers in more advanced countries where these
parts and components are produced, and to the TNCs, which organise such production
networks.
The globalisation of manufacturing processes has been sparked by the search among
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) industries for
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countries, which afford lower factor cost and offer other conditions of comparative
advantage. These corporate objectives have already induced substantial outsourcing of
intermediate manufacturing and assembly tasks to a variety of developing countries
during the 1980s. A World Bank survey (Peters: 1992) not only confirmed these
developments but also projected much further expansion of such industrial practices.
Owing to such trends the demand for long-haul ocean transport of many primary
commodities from developing to industrialised countries can be expected to diminish. On
the other hand, however, there will be an increasing need for small high-value shipments
in short time intervals. The observation reflects changes in production techniques and
organisation, which have evolved for a number of reasons.
Firstly, growing integration of the acquisition, production, and marketing processes
through cost-minimising supply chain management techniques has induced a trend
towards inventory reduction. These developments have already led to very specific
demand for speedy and highly reliable maritime transport services, which are fully
integrated with land transport systems to enable streamlined door-to-door delivery
arrangements.
Secondly, many industries are seeking out and have started to use alternative, more cost-
effective materials. For instance, modern car manufacturing incorporates 40% less steel
than only 10 years ago. The value of goods shipped continues to increase, but they need
far less raw materials to be produced and less space for transportation. Thus many of the
I I
customary cargoes in ocean transport are losing importance and are replaced by others,
requiring very different types of packaging and transport.
The relocation of industries phenomenon is demonstrated by the fact that in some OEeD
economies industrial enterprises move entire production complexes to other countries in
order to bypass quota restrictions and other regulatory market constraints. Japanese car
manufacturing in the United States (US) and Europe is an example.
Indeed, while the share of developing countries In world manufacturing exports,
including those of rapidly growing high-tech products, has been expanding, the income
earned from such activities by these countries does not appear to share in this dynamism.
On this score, a comparison between the developed and developing countries over the
past two decades raises some initial worries. Although developed countries now have a
lower share in world manufacturing exports, they have actually increased their share in
world manufacturing value added over this period. Developing countries, by contrast,
have achieved a steeply rising ratio of manufactured exports to gross domestic product
(GDP), but without a significant upward trend in the ratio of manufacturing value added
to GDP. Accordingly, the increase in the shares of developing countries in world
manufacturing exports has not been accompanied by concomitant increases in their
shares in world manufacturing value added, and in several countries the two ratios have
tended to move in opposite directions.
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Certainly, few of the countries that pursued rapid liberalisation of trade and investment
and experienced a rapid growth in manufacturing exports over the past two decades
achieved a significant increase in their shares in world manufacturing income (Trade and
Development Report: 2002).
The value adding at source represents growing efforts by many developing countries to
obtain better income from indigenous products, which were once shipped in their raw
state but are now increasingly processed prior to shipment. For instance, several
economies within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) group have
started to develop their own petrochemical industries close to the source of crude oil. The
obvious implication of these trends is reduced demand for bulk transport of crude, and
increased volumes of petroleum derivatives, which are carried in product and chemical
tankers. Similar observations apply to other raw materials in the mining and agricultural
sectors, and the related effects on long-term demand for ocean transport (Peters: 1992).
Clearly, for many developing countries, getting the most out of the international trading
system is no longer just a matter of moving away from commodity exports. At the same
time, many of the same forces that adversely affected price and productivity dynamics in
the primary sector, including the competitive structure of markets, income elasticities and
technological weaknesses, need to be re-examined in the light of recent trends associated
with the increased participation of developing countries in the international trading
system. Transport costs, customs and excise duties and other services have come to be
recognised as a major determinant of competitiveness (TIPS: 2002).
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Maritime transport costs have a profound influence on international trade. In some cases,
their trade-inhibiting effect dwarfs that of customs duties (Samson and Yeats: 1977).
More generally, economic research has highlighted the role of transport costs in
determining geographical patterns of trade, production, industrial structure, and income
(Venables and Limao: 1999). Interesting new work even suggests that transport costs (as
an element of trade costs) help explain a variety of puzzles in the field of international
macroeconomics, such as the well-known home biases in consumption and investment,
and the excessive volatility of exchange rates (Obstfeld and Rogoff: 2000). These
observations are interesting from a policy point of view, however, only if something can
be done about these costs. Are transport costs exogenously determined by technological
developments or can they be influenced by policy?
It has been argued that maritime transport costs are kept high by restrictive trade policies,
notably the cargo reservation schemes and monopoly rights granted to providers of port
and auxiliary services (Bennathan: 1989). It has also been argued that private anti-
competitive practices, primarily, but not exclusively on the part of maritime conferences,
are responsible for keeping costs high (Francois and Wooton: 2000). However, most
observers also argue that both public and private trade-restrictive policies are becoming
less and less important (Franck and Bunel: 1991). Yet the available evidence suggests
that transport costs, especially for liner trade, are not falling despite dramatic
improvements in technology, especially in the form of containerisation (Hummel: 1999).
Could it be that the disappearance of restrictions, like the demise of Mark Twain, has
been prematurely announced?
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2.2. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE
During 2001 the growth of world output fell to 1.3% from the remarkable 3.8% achieved
in 2000 (see table 1) and, for the first time since the oil price hike of the late 1970s,
virtually all regions of the world experienced a simultaneous economic slowdown. The
growth of economic output for developing countries was 2.1 %, well above the world
average. The highest growth occurred in African countries, which repeated their
performance of 2000, expanding 2.7%. SA managed to expand output by 2.1 % (Maritime
Transport Review: 2002).
Overall, the rate of economic growth of African countries over the last three years has
exceeded the average growth rate of the last decade.
Table One: World output, 1990-2001 (% change)
"(II'ld till tplll. I "'Ill 211111
(1',11 • t1taar C1ifllt\!.ft)
Region/grouping Average 1990-2000 1999 2000 2001'
World 2.2 2.6 3.8 1.3
Developed economies 2.0 2.4 3.4 1.0
ofwhich:
United States 2.8 3.6 4.1 1.1
Japan 1.1 0.2 2.2 -0.3
European Union 1.7 2.4 3.4 1.6
ofwhich:
Euro area 1.7 2.4 3.5 1.4
Germany 1.6 1.5 3.2 0.6
France 1.4 2.9 3.5 1.9
Italy 1.2 1.4 2.9 1.8
United Kingdom 1.9 2.1 2.9 2.4
Developing economies 4.3 3.4 5.4 2.1
ofwlllclr:
Africa 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.7
Latin America 2.9 -0.2 3.9 0.4
Asia 4.4 4.6 5.8 1.2
Economies in tran itlon -3.0 2.7 6.0 4.3
China 9.3 7.1 8.0 7.3
Source: Calculations by the UNCfAD secretariat based on data in 1995 doUars. as published in U CfAD (2002), Trade
and Development Report lOOZ, United Nations publications, Sales No. E.02.U.D.2, New York and Geneva, table 1.1.
Estimates.
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The industrial production index (1995=100) for the OECD, another fundamental
indicator for the global maritime transport sector, averaged 117.7 in 2001, a decrease of
2.6% from the average index for 2000 (see figure one). This decrease contrasts with the
5.6% increase achieved in 2000, when the index reached 120.8.
Figure 1














oEeD industrial production = World seaborne trade
SOl/rce: GEeD (200 I), Main Economic Indicators. April.
The long-term view is that the overall market with regards to containerisation is that the
market will display consistent growth (see table 2), increasing by between 6% and 7%
over the coming decade (Drewry Shipping Consultants).
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Table 2: Container Ports' Throughput By Regions-1999 to 2015 (millions of TEUs)
REGION 1999 2015 2015 INCREASE
Slow Fast Slow Fast
growth growth growth growth
North Europe 29 63 71 117% 145%
South 22 48 55 118% 150%
Europe/Mediterranean
Middle east/Indian 13 32 51 146% 292%
Subcontinent
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 8 12 100% 200%
Far East 93 243 292 161% 214%
Australasia/Ocean ia 4 9 12 125% 200%
North America 28 58 67 107% 139%
Latin America 16 44 52 175% 225%
TOTAL 210 505 611 140 191%
Source: Amencan ShIpper, January 2001, page 74
Adapted from Muller: Global Trends and Perspectives
2.3. OPERATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY
The main indicators of operational productivity for the world fleet in tons and ton-miles
per deadweight ton (dwt) are shown in table 3 and figure 2. Tons of cargo carried per
deadweight ton in 2001 maintained a level similar to that of 1999 at 7.06, while
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thousands of ton-miles performed per deadweight ton decreased to 29.48. The decrease in
productivity measured in tons of cargo carried per deadweight ton reflects the reduction
of cargo carried relative to the fleet expansion. The decrease in productivity measured in
ton-miles per deadweight ton results from the slowdown of seaborne trade from the peak
reached in 2000 and the expansion of the world fleet.
Table 3: Cargo carried and ton-mile per deadweight ton (dwt) of the total world
fleet, 1999-2001
{ lll'I:" "ani '/1 :1Il11 tflHoJltllt'\ pO'1 IHI HIl',IIIl'!" 11\,:111 \I'l;.:hl I<ln (rh lint tltt I.lfal "fld,IIl""I.
(<I'JH ~(lfl(
Year WorldOeet Total cargo Total ton-miles performed Tons carried Thousands of ton-
(miUion dwt) (million tons) (thousands ofmillions of perdwt miles performed per
ton-mUes) dwt
1990 658.4 4008 17121 6.1 26.0
1991 683.5 4120 17873 6.0 26.1
1992 694.7 4220 18235 6.1 26.2
1993 710.6 4330 18854 6.1 26.5
1994 719.8 4485 19461 6.2 27.0
1995 734.9 4651 20188 6.3 27.5
1996 758.2 4758 20810 6.3 27.4
1997 775.9 4953 21825 6.4 28.1
1998 788.7 5598 23822 7.1 30.2
1999 799.0 5668 24114 7.1 30.2
2000 808.4 5890 22947 7.3 30.9
2001 825.7 5832 24338 7.1 29.5
Sources: World fleet: L1oyd's Register - Fairplay (mid-year data for 1990, year-end data for 1992-2000); total cargo
carried: UNCTAD secretariat; ton-miles: Fearnlcy's, Review,various issues. Data compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat.
What is interesting from the above table, is that the tons carried per dwt over the last
decade, has steadily been increasing. This steady increase is assumed to carry on in the
coming years, which is indicative of growth in the global economy as a whole.
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Figure 2: Index of ton-miles performed per dwt of total world fleet, 1991-2001
In(ll'\ nftnn-lIIilc' "l'r/nrllll'" Ill'" "l'llfh'l'icht W/ln WIll) \\/1,.1" lll'l't, 11)1)1-2001
Thousand Ion-miles





1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1.998 1999 2000 2001
Thousand Ion-miles perfonned per dwt
Source: UNCTAD calculations.
Except for 2001, the ton-mile performed per dwt has seen a steady increase. The
slowdown in 2001 is thought to be the result of a global slowdown in trade. This is not
deemed to last long because the predictions are that the world economy is in a recovery
phase with most developing economies experiencing good growth rates.
2.4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LINER TRADE
Globalisation has brought about changes in the structure of the world economy and the
shipping and port industries have had to respond to the challenges and opportunities that
have arisen as a result ofthe structural changes. Container shipping lines have been faced
with intensified competition in the liner market over the last two decades. They have had
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to adopt innovative, productivity-enhancing and cost-cutting strategies. Seeking further
economies of scale, shipping lines continue to rationalise services, deploying larger ships
to call at a limited number of ports with extensive, integrated feeder networks connected
to regional hinterlands.
Due to the size of the investments made by shipping lines, it is an increasing challenge
for developing economies within a region to maintain competitiveness in the area of
providing maritime services.
Global container shipping lines are under intense pressure to provide shippers with
services that include fast transit times, high frequency and lower costs. This has given
rise to two trends: (a) deployment of increasingly large vessels to achieve economies of
scale and (b) alliances and mergers/acquisitions of carriers as an approach to rationalising
investment, spreading risk and reducing administrative costs. Maritime carriers enter
various types of agreements, which help them enjoy advantages that arise from
cooperation on technical or commercial matters. Far from being a recent phenomenon,
carriers' collusive habits are deeply rooted in the history of maritime transportation, and
the first shipping conferences, covering the routes between UK and Calcutta, date back to
1875. By joining carrier agreements, shipping companies retain their jurisdicial
independence, but consent to common practices with the other members regarding
pricing, traffic distribution and/or vessel capacity utilisation. Examples of carrier
agreements that were recognised in US regulation by the end of 1998 were conference
agreements, co-operative working agreements, joint services agreements, pooling
20
agreements, space charter agreements, and transshipment agreements (Fink, Mattoo and
Neagu: 2000).
Conference agreements are made between two or more ocean common carriers, and
provide for the fixing of and adherence to uniform tariff rates, conditions of service, etc.
among them. Conferences are the most widespread type of rate-binding agreement. In the
US, conferences are required by law not to restrict the entry and exit of any shipping
company. Therefore, shipping conferences in the US foreign trades are "open", while
those covering other routes may be closed to outside carriers (Levitt: 2000). Co-operative
working agreements are defined in the US Shipping Act of 1984 as agreements, which
establish exclusive, preferential, or co-operative working relationships, but which do not
fall precisely within the arrangements of any specifically defined agreement. Only some
of the carrier agreements have a rate-binding clause, i.e. they declare that they engage in
unique price setting for transport services provided by all members.
The high incidence of conferences and other types of carrier agreements in maritime
transport is due to the fact that the US, the European Union (EU) and many other
countries exempt shipping conferences from antitrust regulation on the ground that they
provide price stability and limit uncertainty regarding available tonnage (Francois and
Wooton: 1999). The exemption from antitrust law is compounded by the Federal
Maritime Commission's (FMC) role in helping police price-fixing arrangements. In
recent years, there has been an erosion in the power of conferences for two reasons. The
first is the entrance in the market of strong and efficient outside shipping companies.
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Containerisation and other technological progresses have made it possible for outsiders to
supply the same services as the conferences at lower costs to consumers. A second
development is the change in regulations affecting international shipping, notably the
United States' Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998, amending the Shipping Act
on 1984, entered into force in May 1999. While preserving the antitrust immunity of the
rate-setting conference system, OSRA allows for the confidentiality of key terms (prices
are included in this category) in contracts between shippers and carriers. This amendment
is bound to create greater scope for price competition (Fink, Mattoo, Neagu: 2000).
In response to these developments, two types of arrangements have begun to emerge.
First, shipping lines now sometimes enter "discussion agreements". These allow
conference and non-conference carriers serving a particular trade lane to discuss and
share information about rates, costs, capacity, and service. The members may adopt
voluntary rate, capacity, and service guidelines. Another recent tendency is for shipping
companies and conferences to enter more wide-ranging organisations, such as consortia,
alliances and global alliances. Some major shipping lines such as P & 0 Nedlloyd also
control international terminal networks. This is done to streamline their service offering
and to ensure quick turnaround times.
The effect of containerisation on the liner trade is larger than- that implied by the size and
growth of the container ship fleet. Total seaborne container carrying capacity during 2001
rose by 0.63 million twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs) to 7.41 million TEUs - an
increase of9.2%. Container ships increased their share of this total from 68.9% to 71.4%
22
at the beginning of 2002, for a total of 5.3 million TEUs. The share of general cargo ships
reached almost 20%. Single-deck vessels accounted for 0.81 million TEUs (about 11 %)
while multi-deck ships added 0.66 million TEUs (about 8.9%). During the year, single-
deck tonnage increased 4% while multi-deck tonnage actually decreased 5.4%. During
2001, the number of vessels engaged in the North-South trades increased from 549 to
579. These trades link Africa, Australia-New Zealand and Latin America with the major
east-west routes running along the northern hemisphere. More significant is the fact that
the size of these vessels is increasing. The number of vessels with capacity of more than
2,500 TEUs increased from 50 to 83 and the number of those in the range 1,500-2,499
TEUs increased from 320 to 344. Conversely, the number of vessels in the range 1,000-
1,499 TEUs decreased from 179 to 152 (Maritime Transport Review 2002).
As mentioned earlier, the global container trade is anticipated to grow by about 6%-7%
annually over the coming decade. These rates of growth appear extremely promising.
However, history suggests that supply nearly always exceeds demand and rates are,
therefore, expected to remain under pressure (see table 4).
Table 4: Forecast Global SupplylDemand Balance and Average RevenuelTeu
ESllmal.d N.I Cargo Mov•• Suppl.'
V.ighl.d
Eff.allv. " SlolMovu " p.r O.mand Av.ra•• "Capaall." Chan•• ('OOOI_U) Chang. Effnllv. Ind•••• R.v.nu.' Chan••('OOOI.U) Slol T.u
2000 6.044 1I.2X 92,921 12.5X 15.37 95,8 1.420 2.5x
2001 6.425 6,3x 95.879 3.2X 14.92 92,9 1,267 ·10.SX
2002 7,093 10.4X 103.931 8.4x 14.65 91.3 1,165 ·8.!X
2003 7,543 6.3X 109,569 5.4X 14.53 90.5 1,140 ·2.1X
• After adjustments for mark.t l<1otols (i.•. box supply, differential vessel produotivity, dudweight/slot ratio,




Liner shipping is characterised by a unique set of economic and political features which,
taken together, can produce unstable cycles with respect to both rates and space
availability.
These characteristics include:
• High fixed costs to operate a regular service.
• Relatively inelastic demand for services (meaning that rate reductions very rarely
can increase the market demand or the aggregate quantity demanded in the market
for services). In the case of most commodities, industry rate reductions do not
induce additional volumes and associated revenues.
• Significant mismatches in demand arising from chronic bi-directional trade
imbalances (import and export volumes often differ widely) and significant
fluctuations in demand.
• Inelastic supply (carriers must maintain supply at constant levels sufficient to
meet peak demand, yet are very limited in their ability to rapidly "flex" supply
because of their large fixed sunk costs and the nature of the liner shipping which
requires regular service and strings of vessels that call numerous different ports in
a single voyage). This argument is mitigated to some extent by the significantly
larger role now played by the liner operators in the charter market. It is now far
easier than before for an operator to "flex" supply (except in the case ofmega
ships).
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• "Lumpy" supply (capacity must be added or withdrawn in large units - namely
entire strings of vessels, unlike a railroad which can add or subtract cars from a
train based on variation in demand).
• No regulatory barriers to new entry or capacity expansion.
• Distortive government subsidisation of shipping and shipbuilding (World
Shipping Council: 2001).
While other industries may share with liner shipping one or even several of these
characteristics, a combination of all of them is unique and produces an industry that is
subject to chronic market instability.
The complex operation and management of container systems encompassing different
types and sizes of ships and their containers, sea and inland terminals and inland transport
networks require considerable skill and flexibility. The constant adaptation of transport
activities to serve the large number of customers making use of liner shipping services
having different and changing trading needs is transforming sea carriers and transport
operators into logistics operators better attuned to the needs of the trade.
With the increase in global liner shipping, carriers have sought efficiency in ports to
maximise revenue. In order to achieve cost efficiency, ship owners require their vessels
to spend more time delivering cargo than waiting to load/unload cargo. Ports have had to
compete for business from other ports never previously considered as a competitor. For
example, Felixstowe in the United Kingdom (UK) competes with Rotterdam in the
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Netherlands for transshipment cargo from the liner shipping companies looking at a one-
stop European port. Liner shipping companies want to be able to offer a global service.
This global service involves large ships covering large distances with few stops. This
leads to an increase in transshipment cargoes thus making the port a place of temporary
storage or logistical center for onward transportation (lAME Panama: 2000). This
phenomenon has led to the hub and spoke operations that are now evident in shipping
patterns.
2.5. THE PRODUCTION OF THE PORT SERVICE
There is no single thing that could be adequately described by the mere word 'port' and
no two ports are alike. A port could be from a small sheltered patch of sea that protects
fishermen from the roughness of the sea, allowing them to moor their boats and trade
their wares in safety somewhere in the South Pacific, to the huge industrial complex of
the city-port of Rotterdam, embracing in its expanse hundreds of companies, roads,
railway lines, distribution centres, refineries and other industrial and manufacturing
activity.
Regardless of how it is developed and organised, however, a port's main function is to
enable, hopefully in a safe and cost effective manner, the transfer of goods from sea to
shore and vice versa (Goss: 1990). As such, a port is an interface between sea and land; a
node in a transport chain; a point where goods change mode of transport. Cargo handling
is thus a port's core business. In order to do this, a port has to organise a large array of
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other services, all equally important in the facilitation of cargo transfers: it has to provide
(dredge) sea channels and turning basins of adequate depth (draft) to enable the approach
and manoeuvres of vessels; navigational aids, breakwaters, pilots, tugs and linesmen to
allow vessels to moor and unload safely; equipment to handle goods in port and move
them around; warehouses to store them until they are picked up by their owners;
electricity; water; security; customs; administrative offices and many more.
Port competition is of a very complex nature that has changed considerably since the
introduction of multimodal transport. Often there is no longer a direct transactional
relationship between a customer and a port, as expenses are matters that are under the
control of the shipowner. Shippers need not be interested in a specific port or its handling
capabilities as the multimodal transporter relieves them of this concern by providing a
door-to-door service. The port has simply become a point transited on the way to a final
destination. Although the total distribution costs affect the shipowners' choice of ports,
their decisions are based upon providing a door-to-door service rather than port-to-port
(De Langer: 1999).
Possible savings In inland transportation costs induce container carriers to seek
economies of scale in the inland movements of containers by concentrating the traffic to a
limited number of ports, which have superior access to major inland transportation
corridors. The conclusion is that containerisation, port concentration and intermodality
having reached a high operational and technical stage and have brought a significant
change in marketing structure and hinterland relations (Hayuth: 1982).
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2.6. MEASURING PORT PERFORMANCE
Understanding performance is a concept fundamental to any business, whether it is the
measuring of achievements against set goals and objectives or against the competition.
Ports are no exception and it is only by comparison that its performance can be evaluated.
Ports are, however, a complex business with many different sources of inputs and
outputs, which makes direct comparison among apparently homogeneous ports seem
difficult.
In public ports, expressions of port performance are based on data recorded by port
authorities, which traditionally tend to focus on traffic recordings and parameters used in
tariffing of port services. Most available and reliable data are related to the maritime
interface where information is more easily collected than on the land interface. Port
Authorities usually monitor berth occupancy and dwelling time of ships, characteristics
of calls, performance of ship-to-shore cargo handling and availability of the main pieces
of handling equipment. Additional, but often less reliable data, may be available as
regards landward operations: dwelling time of cargo in ports' warehouses and storage
areas, characteristics of customs and other administrative procedures and, rarely,
performance of handling for pick-up and delivery of goods. These indicators are often
used to forecast port productivity and assess future capacity. Computerised simulation
systems can give accurate estimates of berth capacity and ships' waiting time. Various
statistical programs designed for all-purpose process modeling or specialised in
transportation and port logistics may be used.
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These expressions of performance display mainly a technical capacity. But shippers and
ship-owners have additional requirements; they are also looking for:
- reliability: a steady and predictable performance adapted to shipping lines' schedules;
- cost: a high performance at a competitive and predictable cost;
- quality: no overage, no wastage or pilferage or any damage registered during handling
and storage operations. Progressively, producers and transporters have to comply with
international standards (ISO 9000 or equivalent) and get their process certified; ports, at
least those operating in a competitive environment, have to catch up with this trend;
- adaptability: a capacity to listen to their problems and needs, negotiate and propose
solutions (Fourgeaud: 2000).
A port is also a link in the transport chain and, of course, similar requirements apply as
regards capacity, performance and quality of connections with short-sea and feeder
shipping lines, and with inland transportation networks: road, rail, barges. High
performance is observed in private terminals and poorest performance is often associated
with ports run by public Port Authorities, still in charge of cargo handling and
maintenance of equipment. Beyond such a statement, explaining a poor or a good
performance may require a more thorough analysis.
Exceptionally high performances occur when all parameters concur positively: as far as
containers are concerned, the typical high-performing terminal is dedicated to one or a
few shipping lines and privately run, processes regular and well timed calls of large ships,
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with economies of scale allowing it to be geared with the most high-performing gantry
cranes, and handles shipments representing the major part of the ship capacity. Similar
parameters can be mentioned in the case of bulk (freighted) traffic.
Conversely, In poor performing ports, many causes, often interrelated, may be
mentioned:
- Physical characteristics, mainly nautical access: dredging backlog and other factors
narrowing the access time-slot; land access: ill-maintained pavements, restricted access to
land-transportation networks; and port capacity: lack of berths and storage areas,
insufficient room for modern ship to shore operations;
- Organisational parameters, related to ships: old ships with narrow hatches, large tween
decks, slow moving derricks, spending too long idle time at berth; cargo: ill packaged,
non unitised, damaged goods, organisation of lashing-unlashing of containers; handling
capacity: unsuitable and ill-maintained handling equipment, poorly trained work force,
not enough crane drivers, unsuitable, congested and poorly managed storage areas;
organisation: non-productive methods, ill prepared calls, too restricted working time,
unwillingness of port operators to work at night, commercial operations interfering with
ship-to shore operations, excessive dwelling time of cargo for commercial motives,
documentation delays; procedures: lengthy customs and other administrative procedures
and controls, corruption. Public port authorities but also other administrations, port
operators, ship-owners, and shippers, involved in this process with their own objectives,
may be partly responsible for these shortcomings (Fourgeaud: 2000).
30
The various types of port ownership and organisational structures that exist throughout
the world further complicate the subject. During the last two decades in many countries
the ownership of one of the most important trade entry points into any country, the
seaport, has changed from being solely in the hands of national or local governments into,
either wholly or partially, private hands.
2.7. PRIVATISATION
Privatisation is a concept rather than an actual definable process. The word came into
being during the late 1960s and was later attributed to the UK government's reforms to
ownership and operation of numerous companies managed by the state. Chapman (1990)
has accredited Drucker (1969) as the author of the word 'privatisation', in its American
spelling. The actual process of implementing privatisation is not, however, a new
concept. Neither can it be said to have originated in the United Kingdom (UK). It was
rather a christening of an established process, a renaissance of an earlier idea on the
ownership and management of a company.
Privatisation refers strictly speaking to ownership, but it is a word that has come to be
used to cover a range of different policy proposals. At least three different strands of
privatisation may be distinguished:
• There is a policy of liberalisation or deregulation where certain activities, which
were either reserved to state monopoly or were subject to restricted entry, are
opened to competition from the private sector.
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• There is a policy of contracting out where services previously provided within the
public sector are offered for tender to the private sector.
• There is a transfer of ownership of assets from the public to the private sector.
This is the best-known form of privatisation and involves the sale or partial sale of
state enterprises to the private sector, normally in the form of a share flotation.
2.7.1. ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATISATION
Privatisation in developing countries is often the first phase in a process of industrial
liberalisation and a move towards industrial progression (lAME Panama: 2002). Viewed
as this first step towards creating free trade it has therefore not surprisingly been a high
priority for developing countries. It begins with the transfer of absolute control of
industry away from the government to private partners with particular expertise. The
reasons for this change are numerous but can be summarised as follows:
• improvements in efficiency through private sector management skills;
• enhancement of service quality through improved commercial responsiveness;
• reduction in the fiscal burden of loss-making state enterprises or the need for the
future subsidy;
• a reduction in fiscal demands on central and local government through access to
private sector capital; and
• additional revenue streams (Port Development International: 1999).
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Figure 3 in essence sums up the total benefits of privatisation to the economy at large.
Cass (1996) in his study of world port privatisation concluded that there were only really
three types of port ownership, public, private or joint public/private. He points out that
the most common type of port privatisation are (I) the sale of operating concessions, (2)
joint public/private ventures, (3) private orientated but port authority controlled operating
subsidiaries, (4) the 'corporatisation' of government port agencies or (5) the dissolution
of government owned cargo-handling monopolies. The 'lock, stock and barrel' approach
of Great Britain and New Zealand are exceptions.
2.7.2. THE DISADVANTAGES OF PRIVATISATION
A World Bank report in 1998 stated: "The performance of State-Owned Enterprises
(SOE) can be improved without changing ownership, but evidence from both developed
and developing countries shows that on average good performance has been difficult to
implement and even harder to sustain."
The hoped-for benefits of privatisation do not always occur in practice. Most of the
perceived benefits derive from increased competitive pressures to be found in the private
sector. In many cases privatisation has meant the replacement of a public with a private
monopoly. Newly-privatised firms have been able to charge higher prices leading to
super-normal profits and high dividend payments for shareholders. Such prices have
often been higher than would have been charged in the public sector due to the absence of


































































Figure 3: Potential benefits of privatisation
Source: Du Toit-Structure of the South African Economy, 1999
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the public utilities, and as such, need to be large in order to gain the available economies
of scale. This tendency towards natural monopoly impinges on the benefits to be derived
from competition and can negate any improvements in resource allocation hoped for from
privatisation. Ports are 'pawns in the game' of what is in fact a 'global transportation
system'. Shipping lines have the power to influence port development policies and
contribute to ' ... the plight of public monopoly ports in a highly competitive environment'
(Slack: 1993).
The gains from privatisation may also be checked by the social responsibilities, which
formed part of the remit of the previous state monopolies. They often have to adopt non-
profit maximizing behaviour in order to continue to meet social obligations such as the
need to run unprofitable rural railways and postal services. Elements of cross-
subsidisation, therefore, remain within their pricing strategy, which again prevents a
completely efficient use of their resources.
Finally, the government may not always gain by the sell-off of state assets. The revenue
from privatisation is a once only addition to government finances, whereas the profits of
the newly privatised concerns are no longer available to finance public expenditure.
Future taxation levels may, therefore, need to be higher or future public expenditure plans
reduced. The government will also not be able to use privatised concerns as a way of
conducting economic policy. For example, they will not be able to hold down public
utilities' prices to check inflation or direct their production plans to boost investment or
reduce imports. Instruments for macroeconomic policy can, therefore, be constrained
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following a programme of privatisation and this may reduce the efficiency of the way the
economy is run.
However, the longer-term view that it creates efficiency; profitability and growth are not
issues that are considered by those faced with the prospect of redundancy. But SOEs are
under considerable pressure to perform against a backdrop falling tariffs and increased
trade liberalisations. For this reason, governments deem it fit to let private enterprise
operate and manage firms while they facilitate trade and policy implementation.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.1. TRADE REFORM IN SA
The South African government, and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in
particular, have embarked on a policy framework in order to ensure that the South
African economy becomes competitive. In an increasingly traded global economy, it is
recognised that national economic welfare will be enhanced by both greater efficiency,
brought about by liberalisation, and the need to enhance SA's exports in the world
economy.
The State of Trade Policy in SA aims to develop a rigorous approach to the analysis of
trade reform and the impact it has had on aspects of SA's economy, namely the overall
macro-economy, export behaviour, labour markets, resource allocation and growth.
3.2. WHY TRADE REFORM IN SA?
The South African economy has undergone a gradual process of trade reform in the last
two decades; trade reform is necessary in order to ensure that the economy becomes more
efficient. At the most basic level, trade reform is seen as the key to efficient resource
allocation. Indeed, a growing body of literature (TIPS: 2002) shows that trade reform is
more important in terms of its distributional effects than it is directly on growth; the main
reason for this being that resources are re-allocated from one sector to another as the
economy is opened up to international competition.
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A useful starting point would be to place the parameters of SA's trade regime In
perspective in order to precisely determine the level and configuration of protection
currently prevailing in the economy. More important is the development of a rigorous
approach to the analysis of the impact of trade policy reform so far on the following
aspects of SA's economy: the overall macro-economy; labour markets; export behaviour;
and economic growth. The basic logic behind trade liberalisation is as follows: reduction
of import protection reduces the anti-export bias and enables resources to flow from
poorly competitive sectors to sectors with a comparative advantage.
Is this happening in the South African economy? To what extent is this efficiency and
allocative effect dependent on other factors such as transport logistics, the mobility of
labour market and other factors? Moreover, the impact of trade liberalisation on the
economy remains a contentious issue. Although there is no easily identifiable impact,
what is clear is that the rationale for liberalisation is based on the fact that major
inefficiencies exist in the economy and trade reform, along with a series of accompanying
measures, can play a critical role in spurring growth, albeit indirectly.
A particularly complex problem that researchers face is how best to disentangle the
impact of tariff liberalisation, specifically, from a range of other factors such as exchange
rate movements, transport logistics, growth rates in importer and exporter countries and
other factors. SA is classified as an upper middle-income developing country, and GDP
(at market prices) at the end of2000 was worth R874 billion, at current prices. Real GDP
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has grown annually by approximately 2.6% between 1995-2000 (SA Reserve Bank:
2001).
The issue that will be pursued is the transport logistics factor mainly within the port
domain.
3.3. THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN SA
"The world that we have made as a result of the level of thinking we have done thus far
creates problems that we cannot solve at the same level as they were created"(Albert
Einstein).
The principal economic goal of a nation, like SA, is to provide a high and rising standard
of living for its citizens. This goal depends on the nation's ability to achieve high and
rising levels of capital, labour and management productivity in the activities it performs.
Sustained productivity growth requires that the economy continually upgrade itself, by
improving productivity in existing activities, moving into higher productivity segments of
the industries in which it currently competes, and entering entirely new industries that
offer the prospects for high productivity.
As a result of changes in the political context that have opened SA to the world,
economic reality for SA has evolved dramatically in the last few years. For the first time
in decades, SA has been exposed to the forces of globalisation and, as a result, has
become far more linked into patterns occurring in the larger global economy. This
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manifests itself in nearly every aspect of the economy, from currency valuation to
transport technologies. Globalisation encompasses four particular phenomena, among
others, that are especially relevant to SA's transport sector, given the role of transport as
the key facilitator of international trade:
• Falling tariff barriers to international trade,
• Diminishing non-tariff barriers to trade,
• Reintegration into the global economy,
• Changes in the South African economy.
These factors create new and challenging circumstances for the transport sector.
Classic macroeconomic theory suggests that productive infrastructure, including transport
assets, is one of several key preconditions for national economic growth (Moving
America, US Department of Transportation, 1990). The theory holds that by investing in
assets like bridges, roads, ports, or even telephone lines, a nation can structure
development by reducing transport and communications costs, thereby facilitating further
trade and creation of wealth. Indeed, transport is generally seen as an engine of growth
and a guarantor of national integration, both internally and with the external global
economy.
The ocean freight portion of the containerised transport chain accounts for 83% of the
travel time and 60%-68% of the cost of shipping. This is driven principally by an
average distance of over 11,000 km from international markets. In comparison, inland
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transport requires only 11 % of total travel time and 19%-27% of costs, as demonstrated
in Figure 4 [Moving SA Policy Document (MSA): 1999].
Figure 4: Distribution of Transport Costs Along the Value Chain
Exports
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Note: Based on case studies
Source: Industry inlElfViews, Partnet, Spoomet, MSA Analysis
Thus, the majority of the system costs and transit time occur in the maritime portion of
international container trade. Given the competitiveness of the international ocean freight
business, there are three cost drivers available to manage the costs of containerised ocean
freight: number of stops per ship, distance travelled per ship, and size of ship. The
container industry is in dynamic change. Changes in container ship line dynamics
include:
• Reduction in port calls - the continuing Increase In average vessel sizes is
leading to a stagnation, and even reduction, in the absolute number of ship calls at
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main container ports, In spite of continued strong growth in liner shipping
volumes;
• Shrinking customer base - slot charters, alliances and mergers and acquisitions
are all reducing the number of commercial entities calling at ports;
• Hub ports - selected hub ports are winning important roles as connection and
relay points;
• Fierce pressure on prices - (see table 4 i.e. falling weighted average revenue/teu
from 2000-2003) container ocean freight rates will continue to fall, further
squeezing the already thin margins, which will put pressure on ports to reduce
rates.
Another reason to consolidate at fewer ports is to enable ship lines to operate fewer small
ships and more large ships, which have substantially lower operating costs per TEU due
to much better economies of scale (MSA: 1999).
Some of the benefits in the increase in vessel size would be offset by two factors: volume
growth could lead to increased frequency, and hence continued use of small vessels.
Also, smaller ships serving niche markets would somewhat dilute the full increase in
vessel size. This growth in container ship size could also affect requirements for port
navigation channels, terminal infrastructure, and service levels, although these depend on
maximum vessel size, not average vessel size. Random vessel arrivals and low levels of
capital funding are the key system-level forces influencing poor performance, but there
are also substantial operating inefficiencies at the firm level. These inefficiencies include
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structural concerns like terminal configurations, and operational issues such as low crane
productivity, low crane intensity, inefficient links between customers agents and ship
lines, and constraints on systems and equipment. Substantial improvement will require a
concerted effort by ship lines, ports, and infrastructure investors. Consolidation would
also assist in lowering transit times by reducing ports of call (MSA: 1999).
3.4. COMMERCIAL PORTS POLICY
"Today, globalisation pressures make it essential that nations integrate their transport
systems into the global logistics network. Ports are naturally being incorporated into this
changing system and have to adjust to the new challenges and environment. Government
recognises the strategic value of the commercial ports system in SA, in the context of
international trade initiatives and the changing global transport environment. It is for this
reason that it needed to formulate this policy in support of the efforts to improve the
functioning of commercial ports" (Commercial Ports Policy: 2002).
Ports are integrated and crucial nodal points in a transport system, and play a strategic
role in the country's economic growth and social development. By being part of the
transport network, port activity facilitates the meeting of the demand of the international
market with means of production available in the country. In other words, the ports
system, by virtue of being a set of nodal points in the transport system, facilitates trade,
which in turn fosters greater national economic activity. To maximise these benefits, the
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aspects of efficiency and effective management have to be introduced to the transport
system.
"Government implemented the first stages of port reform with the establishment of the
National Ports Authority of SA (NPA) and the National Ports Operations Division
(NPOD) in 2001. It has since become clear that the economic impact of Durban's
inefficiencies need urgent attention. Thus, we aim to fast-track the inclusion of the
private sector in the operations of the Durban Container Terminal whilst the land and port
estate remains under state ownership" (Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe, MP:
2000).
Note: the National Ports Operations Division is now called the South African Port
Operations (SAPO).
3.5. PORT OF DURBAN
3.5.1. INTRODUCTION
"A port is the lifeblood ofa city and also acts as an economic barometer. (. ..) A port is
also a kaleidoscope ofevents, characters and legends - a richer history one cannot fine!'
(Port Manager, Port of Durban, in: Pearson, 1995).
The port of Durban is the largest port in Southern Africa. Due to the good infrastructural
facilities (road and rail) and reliable service position, it also functions as a container hub
for countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which border on SA to the North. The
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port entrance channel has a depth of 12,8 meters below chart datum and an entrance
width of 122 meters. The water surface covers 892 hectares at high tide and 679
hectares at low tide. The distance around the port is 12 kilometers with the total land and
water area covering 1854 hectares.
• Maximum length 243,8m
• Maximum beam 35m
• Maximum draft It,6m
• Maximum draft
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Figure 5: The layout of the Port of Durban
Source: NPA Public Relations Department
Apart from being Africa's largest general cargo and container port, Durban offers
shippers and shipowners a full range of berthing, cargo handling, and repair, victualling
and bunker facilities (see figure 5).
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3.5.2. CHANGING TRAFFIC BASE FOR THE PORT.
Figure six highl ights the port traffic for October 1969. This was before the
containerisation revolution and the main cargoes were general cargoes and oil as
indicated below.
Durban. Cargo landed totalled
1,379,831 tons, cargo shipped 922 316
tons and cargo transhipped 24,346
tons. The total car 0 handled was
2,326,493 tons. . .
Cargo lande~ cotn,pns ~ 3,63,385
tons general (Includm: od) 6,?87
tons of fertilisers 9,005 on of tun-
.ber and 654 tons of rail' ay materials.
Cargo shipped com ri ed 212,557
tons general (i cludi g oil), 335 t~ns
o fertilisers, 22 861 tons of maJ.ze
and maiz produ 3 899 tons of
grain other ha manz, 6543 tons
of other pr duce, 3,781 tons of wool,
2,608 tons of skins and hides, 82 tons
of \ attIe bark., 4 822 tons r wattle
bark extrac , 129,407 tons f ugar in
'bulk and 23,829 ns in c ntainers,
1.672 tons of citrus fruit, 17 tons of
other' frui ,,' 140, 16 ons f car
coal shipped foreign, 1 ,,874- toO. of
bunker oil and 113 32 tons of ores
and minerals.
During Octo r, 13 ships aggre-
gating 4,448,0 0 tons called at
the port, cOInprisin . 420 ocean-going
vessels, 48 coasters ao.d 45 trawl rs
and whalers; 4,734 passenge dis-
embarked and 2,5 5 embarked.
,,--- .....__.- r"~ '~~~1_....1 *'_ ~l1~rt
Figure 6: Port traffic for the Port of Durban in October 1969.
Source: The South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review-January 1970.
In October 1970, Prof. W.F.S. Steenkamp released a report on Containerisation via the
Ministers of Economic Affairs and Transport. It was projected that by 1975 about 2.6
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million harbour tons (or 30%) of imports and 3.1 million harbour tons (or 16%) of
exports would be economically containerisable. On these findings, assuming two
container harbours and three main depots as well five container ships carrying 1600 20
foot containers were needed, the investment in ships and various facilities needed in SA
would total around R 11 0 million made up of:
Five ships 60
Containers 27
Trailers, clip-on refrigerator units and alternators 1.6
Container Terminals 6.4
Depots at Durban, Capetown and inland 5
Facilities at Port Elizabeth and East London 1.8
Wool facilities 1.2
Miscellaneous requirements 4.6
Total R millions 107.6
Source: SA Shipping News, 1970
It is clearly evident from the above report that as early as 1970, the South African
government saw the potential of containerisation. By the third quarter of 1977, container
ships started to operate between SA and the UK/Northwest Continent. Figure seven
shows the changing port traffic by October 1979.
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Figure 7: Port traffic for the Port of Durban in October 1979.
Source: The South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review Jan-1980.
Today, the Port of Durban is the clear African leader in total container throughput. In the
world port league for 2000 established by Containerisation International Yearbook 2001,
Durban was in 44th position (see table 5 below). The world ranking and the African
ranking are over the last three years from 2000. Clearly the Port of Durban far exceeds
other African ports in the number of containers handled. It is also interesting to note that
SA has three ports in the top 10 of the African ranking table. However by world
standards, all African ports lag behind in the world ranking.
World ranking African ranking Port Country 1997 1998 1999 2000'-40/52144 1/1/1 Durban South Africa 941 733 I 079692 969085 1291 lOO
69171174 2I2J2 Alexandria Egypt 397 J27 515963 l>28 724 601 987
116180175 5/413 Damletta Egypt 606973 309008 432 329 583060
1221100/81 6/5/4 Port Said Egypt 415694 269915 410728 S27 896
115/91/89 3/3/5 Abidjan Cote d'lvoire 416100 468 727 463835 434 654
109/116195 4/616 Cape Town South Africa 316383 329428 331 766 394913
134/125/1 04 817/7 Casablanca Morocco 210687 245382 280 982 311695
146/136/1 07 9/818 POrt Efizabeth South Africa 180000 205 134 250846 242718
1311139/116 719/9 Mombasa Kenya 230047 248 451 232 510 236928
161/151/121 11/12110 Algiers Algeria 120836 162454 190 32S 216052
, ,
Table 5: Container traffic for top ten African ports <twenty foot eguivalents- TEUs)
Source: Port and Harbors April 2002 Volume 47 No.3 Page34
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Containerised traffic is still limited in many African ports because of several factors such
as the structure of the trade, limited investment, inadequate transport facilities and
procedures and tariffs that penalise container traffic. Nevertheless, during the last five
years, there has been significant growth of container traffic on the whole of the continent,
whatever the level of development, and at a higher rate than the world level. Part of this
can be attributed to positive economic growth in Africa. In the future, this tendency may
be reinforced due to the growing trade and the increasing participation of the private
sector in the management and the development of the ports (Ports and Harbors, 2002).
The added volumes of traffic have brought with it a host of problems that many African
and South African ports battle with. Some of these inefficiencies namely structural
concerns like terminal configurations, and operational issues low crane productivity, low
crane intensity, inefficient links between customers agents and ship lines, and constraints
on systems and equipment will be briefly explored.
3.5.3. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE DURBAN CONTAINER TERMINAL
3.5.3.1. TERMINAL LAYOUT
It has been argued that the terminal layout has been part of problem resulting in
efficiencies at the terminal. The quays are Z-shaped (see figure 8) which makes it
difficult to arrange the stacking areas between the various berths. The result of the design
also means that the cranes cannot operate using the full length of the quays. This in turn
means that cranes cannot be moved around as and when required. Another inefficiency is
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that the reefer stacking areas are far removed from the quayside stacks and this causes
long travel times when loading and discharging vessels.
Figure 8: Layout of the Durban Container Terminal.
Source: NPA Public Relations Department
3.5.3.2. AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT.
The following equipment is available at the OCT.
Ship to shore cranes
5 Demag cranes - commissioned around 1977/78 - Safe working load = 40 ton under the
spreader.
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8 Noell cranes - commissioned around 1992 to 1997 - SWL = 40 ton under the spreader;
65 ton using heavy lift beam.
Rail Transfer cranes
2 Demag cranes - commissioned around 1977/78 - Safe working load = 40 ton under the
spreader
1 Morris - commissioned around 1997 - Safe working load = 40 ton under the spreader.
Straddles
25 Noell straddle carriers - commissioned around 1997/98




What is apparent from the above is that a lot of the equipment is old. Although a renewal
programme has started with the straddles, the equipment in use is prone to breakdowns
and unforeseen downtime. The cranes in use are also not suited for the newer vessels that
now utilize the terminal because of their height restrictions. The Moving SA policy
document, 1999 highlights the need for infrastructure upgrades and renewals.
First, and foremost, it is important for meeting customer needs for cost, levels of service,
capacity, and modal choice.
~~T 0-30289
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Second, sustainability is a necessary condition for upgrading, though it is not sufficient
unto itself. Third, transport is a long-term industry - especially reinvestment in
infrastructure, which requires advance planning and funding availability. And fourth,
loss of one industry could destabilise other parts of the system, creating undesirable
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Note: 1. Coom.ier raH reflects estirrates for 1998, actual 1994-1997
2. Includes international carriers
Solsce: MSA Rnandal Model
Figure 9: Estimated Capital Spending as a Percentage of Long-term Capital
Requirements
Figure nine highlights the capital injection required over the long term in order to provide
and maintain world-class standards in our service delivery. Although the ports require a
lot less capital injection than other transport sectors over the long term, the need to
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Box 2: Strategic Actions in Port Infrastructure and Operations
Several key strategic actions emerge in the realm of ports in order to realise the vision of low cost, high reliability,
short transit time service in the corridors and on the maritime leg of general cargo import and export. The key
steps revolve around promoting the consolidation of higher volumes of container traffic into fewer ports. The
highlights of these actions encompass the following:
,/ Identify which ports are to be the core international container export/import ports ofthe future. Also, decide
which ports, if any, will serve as feeder ports to the core container ports. This process should be an inclusive
one of consultation with ship lines, customers, existing port operators, and other entities co-ordinating ports
with the connecting modal infrastructure in the remainder of the corridor.
• Remove the capacity constraints in the port system and direct infrastructure investments in line with the
strategy. This step encompasses several subsidiary actions, including:
,/ In the short-term, address the causes of vessel delays in Durban;
,/ Undertake a long-term capacity exercise, or revise existing capacity planning in light of the
new strategy. Currently, both Durban and Cape Town ports are forecast to experience capacity
constraints, but decisions about consolidation will determine the impact of such constraints;
,/ Invest in the expansion of the selected core ports;
,/ Reduce spending in the non-core or feeder ports to basic requirement levels. It is important to
keep feeder ports operating smoothly, if they are economically viable, since they form a key
link into the core ports. However, capital spending priorities should begin with the core ports;
,/ Stop spending on non-viable ports. Continued investment here will dilute the effectiveness of
the rest of the port system.
• Focus the role of ports. Allowing ports to be self-sustaining on the basis of their own economics is critical to
the ability to upgrade assets and service levels, particularly in entities as capital intensive as ports. The strategy
requires three types of focus: among cargo types, among ports, and among origins and destinations.
At a more detailed level, proper signaling can be restored by:
,/ Retaining capital for reinvestment within the port
,/ Pricing to customers based on operating and capital cost recovery
,/ Focusing roles of individual ports by determining which will be core 'east-west' ports, which
will be feeders, and which will serve differentiated needs of particular customer segments. The
focusing is especially important for containerised general cargo ports.
• Co-ordinate the ports system and integrate it with other modes. This action requires both institutional
reorganisation and changes in the accompanying regulatory environment. The next step is to consider what
institutional form such co-ordination might take.
In all instances, an independent port regulator appears necessary. The key role of the regulator would be to manage
the rates ofretum to the natural monopoly ofport infrastructure.
In addition, one possible choice is for ownership to vest in a national port authority (NPA), which would ensure
that a number of objectives are more easily and effectively accomplished. In particular, an NPA would allow the
co-ordination and control of large infrastructure investments, preventing the squandering of scarce capital for sub-
scale operations. Second, an NPA would allow for a co-ordinated level of control of terminals which could be
either concessioned or opened to competition. And third, an NPA could ensure that terminals respond not just to
customer needs but to national objectives.




upgrade infrastructure is imperative. The port system in SA has suffered from a lack of
investment over the past few years. Box 2 highlights the government's intention with
regard to port infrastructural development.
NPA estimates that over RIO billion a year over the next 10 years is required to upgrade
our entire ports infrastructure to an acceptable standard. If current performance and
utilisation levels of terminals are maintained, by 2007 the industry will need to have
invested almost US$ 14 billion (see table 6) to provide infrastructure to meet the forecast
global demand (Drewry Shipping Consultants).
Some of this can be met by filling spare capacity. However, the location and suitability of
this capacity are critical. Not all current capacity is of the right nature, or in the right
place, and will not get used therefore. This is evident in the Port of Durban where the
marsh area near the terminal cannot be drained out and converted into terminal space due
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Table 6: Potential Container Terminal Investment Required by 2007
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd
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3.5.3.3. VARIATIONS IN EXPORT AND IMPORT LISTS.
Containers Handled I Month
100000
~ ~ ~ ...... ~ ~80000 ~
... I~ ~
.! 60000
E 40000::J -Z --- -~ ~ ~ -.. ........- '"'20000 ~ ..................... • • • •••••• • • ....... .. ......0
J FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJ FMA
2001 - 2003
-+-Import -Export -+- Tranships -M-Total
-
Figure 10: Total number of containers handled at the DCT during 2001-2003
Source: SAPO
The above figure shows the total number of containers that have been handled per month
at the terminal over the last two years. The variations in the lists provided (see table 7)
make it difficult for the berth planners to plan the loading/discharge of a vessel whilst at
the terminal. Table 7 and 8 need to be read in conjunction with each other. This is an
actual sample of data collected for the period 30 April to 07 May 2003. Table 7 provides
conclusive evidence that the shipping lines/agents are not truthful with their declarations
which results in vessel occupying a berth for longer than is planned for. Another
interesting feature that we can extract from table 7 is the vessel arrival times. Here again,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(ETA) given by the shipping lines/agents to the terminal. This inaccurate declaration
sometimes leads to a number of vessels arriving at the port awaiting a berth.
This bunched arrival of vessels then creates the impression that there is congestion in the
port and that the terminal is not operating at optimum efficiency. We will refer later to
the cause of some of the marine delays (see table 9).
This then has a knock-on effect for other vessels waiting to occupy the berth because of
extended stays by offending vessels. The result is further delays for a vessel at anchor
awaiting a berth. This could also lead to vessels then congesting other ports e.g. Cape
Town and Port Elizabeth. This has a reciprocal effect in other ports as well.
Another problem not reflected in the above figure is the number of stows and restows that
occur during the loading/discharging of a vessel. Therefore the actual number of
containers handled during loading/discharging could be far higher than what was actually
planned. This is also not captured in the crane performance statistics indicated below (see
figure 11 and 12).
As explained earlier, the crane operations vary depending on the type of vessel the cranes
are working. It is clearly evident that the cranes work much more efficiently on cellular
vessels than on other types of vessels (see figure 11 and 12). One of the main reasons for
this is that there are no cranes or other obstructions on board the vessels that make it
difficult for the cranes to work a ship.
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Figure 11: Productivity - Cellular
VesselslWeek
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 4 9 14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 2 7 12 17
2001 - 2003
-+-SWH -GCH -'-Port -SWH Target
Notes:
Source: SAPO
SWH -Moves per Ship Working Hour from the first lift to the last lift
GCH -Moves per Gross Crane Hour from the first lift to the last lift
Port -Moves per Hour from the time the vessel arrives at the port
From figure 11 it can be seen that the terminal is unable though, to maintain the moves
per hour per ship's working hour target. This means that the operational efficiency of the
terminal is lagging behind. The move per hour per gross crane hour appears to be quite
constant for cellular vessels whereas this seems very erratic for the non-cellular vessels.
This could mean that the gantry cranes working the cellular vessels are less prone to
stoppages. Beyond what has been discussed, the ageing equipment at the terminal does
seem to justify for this poor performance. Most of the equipment is over 20 years old and
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Source: SAPO
In figure 12 the productivity of the non-cellular vessels is far lower than for the cellular
vessels. This is evident from the moves per hour/per ship working hour. The main reason
for this, as was discussed earlier, is that it is more difficult for the cranes to work a non-
cellular vessel that it is for a cellular vessel. The turnaround time for vessels as is
reflected by the moves per hour from the time the vessel arrives at the port is also a
worrying factor. This could be further skewed by long waiting times for a vessel to obtain
a berth. It also appears evident that the priority for vessels obtaining a berth is given to
the cellular vessels hence the lower turnaround time reflected.
As can be seen by figure 13, the availability of the cranes has been very erratic for much
of 2002 and was starting to play up again towards the latter part of week 15 in 2003. This
begs the question, why? This is mainly attributed to the lack of proper maintenance
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schedules and poor handling of the equipment by the operators. This is therefore further
evidence that the cranes are a major contributing factor to the inefficiencies experienced
at the terminal.
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Source: SAPO
Another explanation for the low percentages on crane availability for much of 2002 is
that most of the availability is linked to planned maintenance stoppages. Because the
stoppages were recorded as breakdowns rather than planned scheduled maintenance
stoppages, this has affected the crane availability/week graph.
3.5.3.4. MARINE DELAVS AND PORT CLOSURES.
The Maritime Services within the NPA have been severely criticised over the last two
years over the availability and numbers of marine pilots in the Port of Durban. A number
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of vessel delays have been attributed to the lack/shortage of pilots to berth/sail vessels.
The validity of these claims is difficult to ascertain. What is evident though, is that the
new slot system, which was implemented during the latter part of 2002, has proved to be
successful. This system allows shipowners and agents (at a premium negotiated tariff
based on the service level agreements between the shipping lines and NPA) to book their
vessels in a slot system to receive priority/premium service.
Another area of concern is that vessels keep changing their sailing times (see table 9),
which affects planning. The reason the shipping lines/agents give is that due to terminal
delays, the sailing times have to change. It almost becomes a cat and mouse game with
the terminal wanting to shift blame away from itself.
The Port of Durban has in the last year (2002-2003) experienced a number of port
closures on account of bad weather (see table 10). The number of closures experienced in
October 2002 was exceptional for Durban. This had never happened in the last five years.
There has been some doubt amongst the shipping lines/agents about the validity of these
closures. Perhaps El Nino and other global warming phenomena could be the cause for
the odd weather patterns experienced. This has resulted in a backlog of vessels awaiting a
berth.
Table 9 must be read in conjunction with table 8 which shows the actual sailing times and
when the vessel crossed the bar. What can be determined from table nine, is that a
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number of delays in sailing times can be attributed to either a crane breakdown or the
vessel awaiting cargo.
CHANGE OF ETDs .WEEK ENDING 08 MAY 2003
bJ~~~~
205 DAL EAST LONDON SAFMARINE 06,07,09,10 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
205 MAERSK CONSTANTlA MAERSK 9,121 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
205 LTTRIESTE COSREN 01,04 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
204 BUNGA TERRA TAl BRIDGE 10,12 GANTRY BREAKDOWN
203 MSC LAURENCE MSC 14,16 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
203 NORASIA ENGIADINA SAFERT 20,22 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
202 MOLOUEME MITSUI 16,19,18,20 AWAITING CONT.
202 BARRIER UNICORN 01,02 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
200 TOGOSTAR POLARIS 20,21,22,06 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
108 MARE IBERICUM FSA 02,04,06 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
108 ARNIS UNITED 20,03,06 GANTRY WORKING SLOW
105 MOL VOLTA MITSUI 18,22,00 WORKING SLOW
Table 9: Actual Sailing time changes for the period 30/04-07/05/2003
Source: NPA Port Control
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13r .- OPEN )1:30
CLOSED 09:30
14.Octobcr OPEN 06:45
Table 10: Port of Durban closures for 2002/3.
Source: NPA Port Control
3.5.3.5. TERMINAL MANAGEMENT.
Management of the terminal has been severely critisised for inadequately addressing
problems. The main reason for this is the lack of skills and qualified trained personnel.
This paper has indicated earlier that terminal operations are complex in nature. With the
increasing container volumes and the decreasing number of vessels arriving at the port, it
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IS imperative that the terminal has systems and personnel equipped to handle any
challenge.
The DCT has been hard hit by strike action over the last few years. This has really
hindered the terminal's performance and has caused it to be unreliable to the needs of the
shipping community. The last strike to affect the terminal was from the 29 November to 4
December 2001. The source of the dispute between management and labour emanated
from the introduction of the incentive scheme for the management as well as an existing
agreement for the payment of performance-based bonuses to employees within other
Transnet divisions (Business Report, December 18 2001).
The second area of dispute related to protracted delays in the Grades Review process. Job
grading delays have been the unfortunate result of the divisionalisation of Portnet. The
general consensus is that proper planning and foresight on the part of SAPO management
could have averted this industrial action. These strikes have indeed been a major cause of
the backlogs of vessels awaiting berths (Business Report, December 18 2001).
Another area of concern is the fear of the privatisation of the terminal. Poor
communication to all stakeholders of government's intention to concession the terminal
has created a lot of uncertainty. Labour fear job losses and restructuring. This in turn, has
caused the terminal's workforce to participate in "go-slows" and other negative actions
(Business Report: December 18 2001). Once again, this has caused the productivity of




What is the effect of poor terminal efficiency on the greater economy? Is it justifiable for
port terminals to underperform? The answer to the following can be seen in figure 14.
The delays experienced by the shipping lines and the revenue lost as a result of this is
now passed on to the buyers who in turn pass these extra costs onto the final consumers.
The resultant negative impact of this is detrimental to a developing economy such as
ours.
Shipping lines to tax Durban cargo
Figure 14: Surcharge on containers handled at South African ports
Source: Business Report 17 January 2002
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The ocean transport costs within the transport chain are being maintained at low levels by
trying to achieve economies of scale. But port productivity can go a long way by trying to
achieve lower voyage cost per TEU. This can be seen in box 3.
Impact of Port Productivity of Unit Voyage Cost of large Containerships
A recent study of economies of scale in large containerships gives an Indication of the unit cost benefits tharcan be
obtained by use of increasingly larger containerships - and the benefits that can be achieved by increased cargo han-
dling productivity that reduces port time. The study prepared by K. Cullinane and M. Khanna and published in the
Journal ofTransport Economics and Policy models the impact of using containerships with nominal capacity to 8000
TEU, assuming current cargo handling rates and rates that would be 100 percent higher.
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To the right is a chart taken from the study
that shows the relationship between voy·
age cost per TEU, ship capacity and route
distance on three major Iinehaul routes.
Unit cOSt declines at a decreasing rate as
Ship capacity increases. In deriving these
unit costs, the authors assume that port
time for various size ships reflects current
cargo handling productivity, which In turn
is a function of the number of cranes
assigned to a ship and the handling rate
per crane. Based on a questionnaire by the
authors, current practice is to typically
employ one to two cranes on ships under
1000TEU capacity, three to four cranes on
ships 3000 to 4000 TEU capacity and five
cranes on ships of 6000 TEU capacity.
Crane productivity under current practices
is assumed to average about 22 moves per
hour. On this basis, five cranes wor1<ing a
6000 TEU containership can load and dis-
charge 2000 20 ft boxes and 200040 ft.
boxes at a rate of 110 moves per hour, and
the ship can be Fully discharged and loaded
in 72 hours.
Increasing Port Productivity
The authors then examine the sensitiVity of
reducing port time through increased
cargo handling rates. They show that a
cargo handling rate double that of the cur·
rent rate will significantly reduce the unit
cost, as the sh!p will be able to carry more
containers in a given time period. For
example, dOUbling the cargo handling rate
will reduce the unit cost of a 6000 TEU hip
from $114 to $91 per TEU on a trans-
Atlantic voyage. The unit cost of a similar
Ship on a trans·Pacific voyage would drop
from $182 to $159 perTEU and on a
Europe·Far East voyage from $242 to $218.
Box 3: Achieving economies of scale and lowering handling costs.
Source: Worldbank Port Reform Toolkit
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As we have seen earlier, the Port of Durban can only operate more efficiently if the
necessary infrastructure upgrades occur to ensure the port offers world-class facilities
with high operating and economic efficiencies. To meet this challenge, the NPA is
investing over one billion rand in infrastructure upgrades in the Port of Durban. The
project, known as the Port Development 2005 Project, has already commenced in 2003
(see figure 15). The Port of Durban has not achieved its full potential for the
transshipment of containers due to capacity constraints and inconsistent service levels.
From the port's perspective, it is believed that with the future expansion possibilities
within the port, it should be developed further as the regional hub in the medium term.
The aims and the philosophy of the project are in line with the Moving SA Policy
document.
"Strategic Actions in Port Infrastructure and Operations
Several key strategic actions emerge in the realm of ports in order to realise the vision of
low cost, high reliability, short transit time service in the corridors and on the maritime
leg of general cargo import and export. The key steps revolve around promoting the
consolidation of higher volumes of container traffic into fewer ports. The highlights of
these actions encompass the following:
• Identify which ports are to be the core international container export/import ports of
the future. Also, decide which ports, if any, will serve as feeder ports to the core
container ports. This process should be an inclusive one of consultation with ship
lines, customers, existing port operators, and other entities co-ordinating ports with
the connecting modal infrastructure in the remainder of the corridor.
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• Remove the capacity constraints in the port system and direct infrastructure
investments in line with the strategy. This step encompasses several subsidiary
actions, including:
- In the short-term, address the causes of vessel delays in Durban;
Undertake a long-term capacity exercise, or revise existing capacity
planning in light of the new strategy. Currently, both Durban and Cape
Town ports are forecast to experience capacity constraints, but decisions
about consolidation will determine the impact of such constraints;
- Invest in the expansion of the selected core ports;
- Reduce spending in the non-core or feeder ports to basic requirement
levels. It is important to keep feeder ports operating smoothly, if they are
economically viable, since they form a key link into the core ports.
However, capital spending priorities should begin with the core ports;
- Stop spending on non-viable ports. Continued investment here will dilute
the effectiveness of the rest of the port system" (MSA: 1999).
However, it would appear that the current development underway in the port is only
going serve as a medium term relief with regards to capacity constraints experienced
by the terminal. The Port Development 2005 Project aims to achieve a two million
TEU throughput capacity in the Port of Durban container terminal. The realisation is
that this extra capacity being added to the terminal will only last up until 2007/8. This
can be seen in box 4, which highlights the growth rates that are actual and projected.
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t Co t contain r traffic about 60/0 p.a.
A e annual ro-.vtb iD Coast container Lraffic b ""een I 50/0 and 20% p.a.
~ eon 1992 and 1995.
In 1995 the RotteTda.rrl consu IUlnts predicted that such high levels of gro"71:b could persist
through 1996, levelling of'to bc1:vVeen 9% and I I % p.a. b 2000, and stabilising the·rea.ftcr
at 7% to 8% p.a. <'High road" and "Lovv road" grovvth scenarios ,"vere predicted (See
Figure 1)
'"Tbc drarna:t.ic increase in container traffic experienced in 1994 and 1. 995 ~s largely a
response to Sout.h Africa~s emergence &om trading isolation This unprecedented gro,'IVth
did not persist into 1996.
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Box 4: Actual and projected growth rates for containerised traffic in the Port of
Durban
Source: NPA Port Engineers Department
However, several roleplayers, including the Association of Shipping Lines, which
represents about 90% of all shipowners operating in SA ports, say that by coupling the
current development with improved productivity and other efficiencies gains the port,
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The much-anticipated draft National Ports Authority Bill, 2002 sets out the framework
for the concessioning process due to begin at DCT at the end of2003. The following is an
abstract from the Port Bill with regards to concessioning.
" Agreements and partnerships in terminal operations and services
34. (1) The Authority may enter into a concession agreement or a public-private
partnership agreement with any person in terms of which that person, for the period and
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement, is authorised to-
(a) design, construct, rehabilitate, develop, finance, maintain and operate a port terminal
and provide services relating thereto; or
(b) provide any other service within a port designated by the Authority for this purpose. "
Privatisation in developing countries is often the first phase in a process of industrial
liberalisation and a move towards industrial progression.
Viewed as a first step towards creating free trade it has therefore not surprisingly been a
high priority for developing countries. It begins with the transfer of absolute control of
industry away from the government but can be summarised as follows: improvements in
efficiency through private sector management skills; enhancement of service quality
through improved commercial responsiveness; reduction in the fiscal burden of loss-
making state enterprises or the need for the future subsidy; a reduction in the fiscal
demands on the central and local government through access to private sector capital; and
additional revenue streams (Port Development International: 1999).
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There is general consensus with most of these arguments and support of the
concessioning of the DCT because it would lead to greater private sector participation not
only in the port but also the Ethekwini Metropolis.
The Port of Durban is an important gateway with regards to general cargo flows
especially since the port's goal is to become a hub port in the Southern Africa. It has
great economic value for the city and the country at large. It can be seen that the poor
economic and operational efficiency of the port leads to poor overall economic growth
for the nation. It is therefore desirable to ensure that the terminal is always operating at
optimum operating efficiency with the required infrastructure and capacity in place.
Random vessel arrivals and low levels of capital funding are key system-level forces
influencing poor performance, but there are also substantial operating inefficiencies at the
firm level. These inefficiencies include structural concerns like terminal configurations,
and operational issues. These are low crane productivity, low crane intensity, inefficient
links between customers agents and shipping lines, and constraints on systems and
equipment. Substantial improvement will require a concerted effort by shipping lines,
ports and infrastructure investors.
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